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Abstract
This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation O( logm
log logm
)-approximation mechanism for com-
binatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of maximizing the social welfare in combinatorial auctions with subadditive
bidders. In this problem, we have a set M , |M | = m, of heterogeneous items, and n bidders. Each
bidder i has a valuation function vi, vi : 2
M → R. We assume that the each valuation vi is normalized
(vi(∅) = 0), non-decreasing, and subadditive: for each two bundles S and T , vi(S) + vi(T ) ≥ vi(S ∪ T ).
This important class of valuations contains other interesting classes. In particular, it strictly contains
the class of submodular valuations. Our goal is to find an allocation of the items (S1, . . . , Sn) that
maximizes the welfare: Σivi(Si). The efficiency of our algorithms will be measured in terms of the
natural parameters of the problem: n and m. Since the valuation functions are objects of exponential
size, we assume that they are represented by black boxes that can answer any type of queries. In
particular, we assume that bidders are computationally unbounded and measure only the amount of
communication between them.
Feige [8] obtains a 2-approximation algorithm by applying an ingenious randomized rounding. This
is the best possible [6] in polynomial communication. Much research was concerned with the design of
truthful algorithms for the problem: algorithms in which a profit-maximizing strategy for each bidder
is to truthfully answer the queries. The simplest and strongest notion considered is deterministic
truthfulness, when no randomization is allowed. The VCG mechanism is truthful and optimally solves
the problem, but it is not computationally efficient. The best truthful approximation algorithm known
achieves a poor approximation ratio of O(
√
m) [6], which is achieved by a maximal-in-range algorithm
(see below). An evidence that deterministic algorithms cannot achieve an improved approximation ratio
was given in [5]: maximal-in-range algorithms cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than m
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with polynomial communication.
If randomization is allowed, there exists a universally truthful mechanism (a distribution over de-
terministic truthful mechanisms) that guarantees an approximation ratio of O(logm log logm) [3]. This
paper relaxes the solution concept and considers mechanisms that are truthful in expectation: truth
telling maximizes the expected profit of each bidder, where the expectation is taken over the internal
1
random coins of the algorithm. We stress that truthful-in-expectation is much weaker than universal
truthfulness: in particular, bidders that are not risk neutral may not be incentivized to bid truthfully.
See [7] for a discussion.
In this note we show that there exists a truthful-in-expectation O( logmlog logm)-approximation mecha-
nism that uses only polynomial amount of communication. While this only slightly improves the best
approximation ratio provided by universally truthful algorithms (at the cost of weakening the solution
concept), we feel that this result is of interest for two main reasons (1) the random-sampling based
techniques of [3] do not seem capable of achieving a better than a logarithmic factor, so this result
might hint at a performance gap between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms
in our setting, and (2) our rounding technique is non-trivial and may be of independent interest.
Our algorithm is described in the communication complexity model. The model is best suited
for proving strong, unconditional impossibility results. In particular, for algorithms it should not take
advantage of the unlimited computational power of the bidders. Indeed, essentially all known algorithms
known for combinatorial auctions need polynomially bounded computation power and use a restricted
and natural communication form, e.g., demand queries (given prices per item p1, . . . , pm return a bundle
that maximizes the profit). Unfortunately, we do not know how to implement our algorithm using
demand queries, or any other type of natural query. In a sense, this is an abuse of the communication
complexity model; hence we recommend viewing our result as demonstrating the falsehood of certain
strong impossibility results for the problem, rather than as a “real” mechanism suitable for use in
combinatorial auctions.
Let us briefly discuss the techniques we use. Almost all truthful deterministic mechanisms known
in the literature are maximal-in-range, a scaled-down version of the classic VCG mechanism: for every
set of valuations, select the welfare-maximizing allocation in a predefined set of allocations. However,
as mentioned above, [5] shows that this method can only guarantee a poor approximation ratio in our
setting. One way to overcome this obstacle was spelled out by [4] which suggested to use maximal
in distributional range (MIDR) mechanisms: for every set of valuations, select the welfare-maximizing
distribution in a preselected set of distributions over allocations, then sample an allocation from this
distribution. This results in a truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Furthermore, in [4] it is shown that
for some problems MIDR mechanisms may be more powerful than any universally truthful mechanism.
Our mechanism is also MIDR1. The basic idea is to represent each bidder by a proxy bidder, find
the optimal fractional solution among these proxy bidders, and then round the fractional solution. Each
proxy bidder is defined so that he “simulates” the expected value of the bundle after the randomized
rounding. The main obstacle is to prove feasibility while still being able to relate the value of the
rounded solution (that was calculated with respect to the proxy bidders) to the original bidders.
We note that Lavi and Swamy [9] already implicitly used maximal-in-distributional-range algorithms
together with the LP relaxation of the problem. Our solution requires a subtler rounding of the LP, and
in particular overcomes one of the main barriers of [9]: their decomposition is based on an algorithm
that “verifies” the integrality gap, and thus they can only provide a truthful-in-expectation O(
√
m)-
approximation mechanism for our setting. Our mechanism uses a direct approach to “decompose” a
linear program with proxy bidders. This is one of the main reasons for our success in guaranteeing a
better approximation ratio.
The main open question we leave open is the existence of a constant-ratio truthful-in-expectation
mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. A first step in this direction might be
to prove that no polynomial time MIDR mechanism can achieve an O(1) approximation in polynomial
time.
1In fact, our range will consist of distributions over infeasible allocations, but we will always output a distribution over
feasible allocations with the same expected welfare as the best distribution in the range. Hence the mechanism is equivalent
to MIDR (see [5]), and truthfulness in expectation follows.
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2 The Mechanism
2.1 The Range
We first remind the reader the linear program relaxation of the problem:
Maximize: Σi,Sxi,Svi(S)
Subject to:
• For each item j: Σi,S|j∈Sxi,S ≤ 1
• for each bidder i: ΣSxi,S ≤ 1
• for each i, S: xi,S ≥ 0
Definition 2.1 A distribution D over (not necessarily feasible) allocations is called (c, p)-fractional if
there exists a feasible fractional solution to the LP such that D is equal to the distribution produced by
the following process: with probability p no bidder is allocated any item. With probability 1 − p each
bidder i receives exactly one bundle S with probability xi,S and keeps each item j ∈ S with probability c,
independently at random.
Definition 2.2 (the range) The range Rc,p consists of all (c, p)-fractional distributions.
Before proving that there is one distribution in Rc,p that provides a good approximation, we require
the following definition:
Definition 2.3 Given a valuation v, let the c-proxy valuation v′ be:
v′(S) = ET∼DS [v(T )]
where D is the distribution where each j ∈ S is in T with probability c independently at random.
Lemma 2.4 The optimal distribution in a Rc,p range is an O( 1c·p)-approximation to the optimal social
welfare if the valuations are subadditive.
The proof of this lemma immediately follows by considering the optimal allocation and using the
following proposition from [8]:
Proposition 2.5 (paraphrasing [8]) Let S be a bundle, v a subadditive valuation, and c such that
0 ≤ c ≤ 1 and 1
c
is an integer. Then, v′(S) ≥ c · v(S), where v′ is the c-proxy valuation of v.
2.2 The Algorithm
1. For each valuation vi of bidder i, let v
′
i be the c-proxy valuation.
2. Solve the linear program relaxation of the problem with respect to the c-proxy valuations v′i.
3. Each bidder i is tentatively assigned exactly one bundle Si, where bundle S is allocated to i with
probability exactly xi,S . If there is an item that is allocated more than
1
c
times, the algorithm
halts and no bidder is allocated any items. Otherwise, proceed to the next steps.
4. For each bidder i, let qi be the probability that some item in Si was allocated more than
1
c
−1 times
in the following random experiment: each bidder i′, i′ 6= i, is allocated bundle S with probability
xi,S .
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5. Independently for each item j ∈ S, select at most one bidder to receive j, so that each bidder that
is tentatively allocated Si such that j ∈ Si receives item j with probability exactly c.
6. For each bidder i, with probability 1 − p1−qi he is not allocated any items, and with probability
p
1−qi
he keeps the items that he was assigned in the previous step.
We note that the last step of the algorithm is a re-implementation of the main idea behind the
truthful-in-expectation mechanism for single-minded bidders of [1].
In our proofs we assume m is large enough (when m is a constant VCG can be implemented in
polynomial time in n). Also, from now on we fix and c = log logm100 logm and p =
1
20 . We first have to make
sure that the algorithm is correctly defined. For that we have to prove that p ≥ 1 − qi, for every qi.
This follows from the next claim [8, 6]:
Claim 2.6 ([8]) Fix any feasible solution of the linear program. Allocate each bidder i exactly one
bundle where each bundle S is allocated with probability xi,S. The probability that no item is allocated
more than 1
c
times is at least 1− 1
m
.
In other words, qi ≤ 1m ≤ p, as needed. We now show that the algorithm indeed finds the optimal
distribution in the range and uses a polynomial amount of communication.
Lemma 2.7 The algorithm finds a distribution with value that equals the distribution with the maximum
expected welfare in R(c,p).
Proof: Notice that the optimal solution of the linear program with the proxy valuations is exactly the
expected value of the optimal distribution in Rc,1: the proxy valuations “simulate” the random process
where each bidder keeps each item with probability c. Thus, it suffices to prove that the algorithm
always find a solution with value exactly p · OPT , where OPT is the value of the optimal solution of
the LP. This will guarantee us that the expected value of the solution equals R(c,p).
Notice that after Step 3 the expected value of the sum of the tentative bundles (with respect to
the proxy valuations) is exactly the value of the optimal solution of the linear program. After step 5
the expected value of the bundles assigned to the bidders (now with respect to the real valuations) is
greater than p · OPT . The last step “cancels” some of the allocations so that if bidder i was allocated
bundle S, the probability he will be allocated some items from S (i.e., the probability that auction is
not canceled at Step 3 and that he keeps some items at Step 6) is exactly p · xi,S. Thus the expected
value of the solution is exactly p · OPT , as needed.
Lemma 2.8 The communication complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in n and m.
Proof: The only two steps for which it is not obvious that only polynomial communication is required
are Steps 2 and the calculation of the qi’s. In Step 2 we solve a linear program that calculates the
optimal fractional solution for some valuations. This can be done in polynomial communication, as long
as demand queries are available [2]. In our case we need to compute answers to demand queries with
respect to the proxy valuations. This can be done by each bidder i with no additional communication
since each proxy valuation v′i depends only on vi. We note that the support of the solution of the linear
program consists only of polynomially many variables [2].
Calculating each qi can be done using no communication cost simply by enumerating over all possible
outputs of the random coins.
Together we have:
Theorem 2.9 There exists a truthful-in-expectation O( logmlog logm)-approximation mechanism for combi-
natorial auctions with submodular bidders. The algorithm uses polynomial communication.
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